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Abstract
This paper reexamines monetary non-superneutrality and the op-
timality of the optimum quantity of money in the money-in-utility
Sidrauski model with endogenous ￿ uctuations of the time preference
by introducing in￿ ation aversion. It is shown that the long-run su-
perneutrality of the standard Sidrauski model does not hold, and
Friedman￿ s optimum quantity of money is not optimal.
Keywords: In￿ ation Aversion, Endogenous Time Preference, Mon-
etary Superneutrality, Optimum Quantity of Money
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: E31, E5, O41
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1In￿ ation, a term familiar to economists, policy makers and common citizens,
makes people impatient, anxious, nervous and less con￿dent. Many econo-
mists have studied the economic and psychological costs of in￿ ation. Keynes
(1936) points out that in￿ ation leads to economic, social and institutional
uncertainty and strikes at con￿dence. Much earlier than Keynes, Bohm-
Bawerk (1891) says that in￿ ation increases the time discount rate. Facing
high in￿ ation in the late 1960s and 1970s in the United States, Katona (1975)
tells us that, with high in￿ ation, even if real income has remained constant
or increased substantially, people still feel cheated, and psychologically they
regard in￿ ation as a ￿bad thing￿ . At the same time, Fabricant (1976) states
that the uncertainty and anxiety from in￿ ation makes more impatience and
a large time discount rate and that high in￿ ation makes rational calculation
more di¢ cult or impossible and makes people possess even less ￿adequate
power to imagine and to abstract￿the future. Burns (1978) also writes that
￿by causing disillusionment and breeding discount, in￿ ation excites doubts
among people about themselves, about the competence of their government,
and about the free enterprise system itself.￿More recently, Shiller (1996) has
written that ￿it was very easy to see why people dislike in￿ ation: people
think in￿ ation erodes their standard of living￿ ; and that ￿this standard of
living e⁄ect is not the only perceived cost of in￿ ation among non-economists:
other perceived costs are tied up with issues of exploitation, political insta-
bility, loss of morale, and damage to national prestige.￿All these statements
and assessments lead to the same conclusion: in￿ ation tends to impair the
patience and con￿dence of the people.
In order to model this negative e⁄ect of anticipated in￿ ation on patience,
we take the time preference rate as an increasing function of the in￿ ation rate
endogenously, and name it ￿in￿ ation aversion￿ . The objective of this paper
is to investigate the macroeconomic implication of this ￿stylized￿psycholog-
ical fact. Actually, Stockman (1981) has given some hints on this modelling
strategy in the ￿rst footnote of his paper. He says that ￿if in￿ ation a⁄ects
￿ (the time preference rate) in the steady state, then any e⁄ect of in￿ ation
on the capital stock is possible, depending upon how in￿ ation a⁄ects this
particular aspect of ￿ tastes￿ .￿Stockman￿ s analysis had been anticipated by
Keynes (1936) who had attached great importance to this psychological char-
acteristics of human nature and states the endogenous ￿ uctuation of the rate
of time-discounting (page 93), ￿The state of con￿dence, as they term it, is a
matter to which practical men always pay the closest and most anxious atten-
tion. But economists have not analysed it carefully and have been content,
2as a rule, to discuss it in general terms. In particular it has not been made
clear that its relevance to economic problems comes in through its important
in￿ uence on the schedule of the marginal e¢ ciency of capital. There are not
two separate factors a⁄ecting the rate of investment, namely, the schedule of
the marginal e¢ ciency of capital and the state of con￿dence. The state of
con￿dence is relevant because it is one of the major factors determining the
former, which is the same thing as the investment demand-schedule.￿
A large literature has examined the relationship between endogenuous
time preferences and monetary superneutrality. Uzawa (1968) sets up an
in￿nitely-lived-representative-agent model with an endogenous time prefer-
ence to replicate the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect. By assuming that the rate of time
preference is an increasing and convex function of the current level of utility,
he shows that monetary growth raises savings and the capital stock. Using
Uzawa￿ s time preferene, Obstfeld (1981) further examines the long-run mone-
tary non-superneutrality in a small open economy. Epstein and Hynes (1983)
have also examined monetary superneutrality in Sidrauski (1967) model and
concluded that a higher rate of monetary expansion increases the steady-state
levels of consumption and capital stock, and reduces the steady-state level of
real balances. Recently, in a growth model with the Marshallian time prefer-
ence, Gootzeit, Schneider and Smith (2002) show that a permanent increase
in government expenditure causes ￿super-crowding-out￿of consumption and
lowers the steasy-state capital stock. By modelling time preference as an
increasing function of real wealth, Kam (2005) has also reexamines the exis-
tence of the Tobin e⁄ect.1
And ever since Friedman puts forward his famous rule for the optimum
quantity of money2, many economists have examined its optimality. It has
been shown to be optimal in monetary economies with monopolistic compe-
tition (Ireland, 1996) and, under certain circumstances, in a variety of mone-
tary economies where government levies other distorting taxes (Chari, Chris-
tiano and Kehoe (1996), Gahvari (2007), Ireland (2003) and Da Costa and
Werning (2008)). However, there exist several cases where the Friedman rule
is not optimal. These include economies with cash-in-advance constraints
1Actually, many papers have examined the recursive structure of the endogenous time
preferences, such as Obstfeld (1990), Epstein (1983, 1987).
2Friedman (1969) argues that a positive nominal interest rate represents a distortionary
tax on real money balances. To reach the ￿rst-best, the distortion should be removed and
the nominal interest rate should be set to zero. This prescription is known as the Friedman
rule for the optimum quantity of money.
3(Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), and Ellison & Rankin, 2007); economies
with time inconsistency of monetary and ￿scal policy (Alvarez, Kehoe and
Neumeyer, 2004), economies with intergenerational wealth e⁄ects of mone-
tary growth (Gahvari, 1988, 2007); economies with redistributive e⁄ects of
monetary growth (Bhattcharya, Haslag and Martin, 2005), and economies
with strong Tobin e⁄ects (Bhattcharya, Haslag and Martin, 2009).
The paper incorporates ￿in￿ ation aversion￿into the standard Sidrauski
(1967) model and reexamines monetary superneutrality and the optimality
of Friedman￿ s rule for optimum quantity of money. Again, ￿in￿ ation aver-
sion￿means that in￿ ation causes people to become more impatient and they
increase their subjective discount rate. The formal model of in￿ ation aver-
sion is presented in section 2. In Section 3, we show the dynamics of the
system and study the properties of the steady state. Comparative dynamics
are analyzed in section 4, and a summary of our main ￿ndings concludes the
paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The Endogenous Time Preference with In￿ ation
Aversion
As is well known, the time preference rate is a measure of the agent￿ s patience
in common sense. And in the continuous-time model, the larger the time
discount rate, the less patience the agent. Usually the time discount rate is
assumed to be an exogenously given, positive constant. In order to investigate
the possible economic e⁄ects of the psychological aversion of in￿ ation, we
assume that the time preference rate of the representative individual is a
strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the expected in￿ ation rate.
That is,




00(￿t) < 0;￿(0) = ￿f: (2)
Asumptions (1) and (2) make the time preference rate endogenous, and
they imply the higher the in￿ ation rate, the less patience the individual. But
notice that the decrease in the patience is at a decreasing rate. Moreover,
the discount rate is a positive constant if the in￿ ation rate is zero, just like a
4￿Fisherian￿consumer with a constant rate of time preference, i.e., ￿(0) = ￿f.
Furthermore, it is also assumed that the time discount factor of the individual
at time t depends not only on the current level of in￿ ation, but also on the







Then the modelling strategy has generated a new state variable, the real
time discount factor ￿t. Di⁄erentiating ￿t with respect to t in equation (3),
we obtain the dynamic accumulation equation of the time discount factor,
namely,
_ ￿t = ￿(￿t): (4)
With these new elements introduced, this paper will reexamine the Sidrauski
model and the long-run e⁄ects of the monetary policy.3
2.2 The Sidrauski Model with In￿ ation Aversion
2.2.1 Consumer￿ s Behavior






subject to the budget constraint
_ at = rtkt + wt ￿ ct ￿ ￿tmt + ￿t; (6)
and wealth constraint
at = kt + mt; (7)





rvdv) = 0; (8)
3For simplicity, we just consider the case without population growth.
5where ct ;mt;kt, and at are consumption, real money balances, physical cap-
ital stock, and total wealth, respectively; rt and wt are the real interest rate
and real wages; ￿t and ￿t are the time discount factor and the expected
rate of in￿ ation; and ￿t denotes lump-sum real money transfer payments.
The stock constraint requires that the total wealth at be allocated between
capital kt and real balances mt. And the no-Ponzi-game condition rules out
unlimited borrowings. The instantaneous utility function Ut = u(ct;mt) is
assumed to be well-behaved, satisfying uc > 0; um > 0; ucc < 0; umm < 0;
uccumm ￿u2
cm > 0 and the Inada conditions. Following Sidrauski (1967) and
Fischer (1979), we assume that both commodities are not inferior4. Further-
more, to reach a de￿nitive conclusion, following Calvo (1979), we assume
that consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth-complementary,
i.e., ucm > 0:5Intuitively, an increase in real balances raises the marginal
valuation of consumption and increases consumption; and a lower level of
money holdings decreases the marginal valuation of consumption and low-
ers consumption. Hence, in the steady state, consumption and real money
balances move in the same direction.
To proceed, the optimization problem of the representative consumer is
to maximize (5), subject to (6), (4), (7) and (8). The Hamiltonian associated
with this problem is
H = u(ct;mt)e
￿￿t+~ ￿t[rtkt+wt￿ct￿￿tmt+￿t]+~ ￿t￿(￿t)+~ qt(kt+mt￿at); (9)
where ~ ￿t and ~ ￿t are the multiplier associated with the constraints (6) and
(4), representing the shadow values of wealth and time discount factor, re-
spectively; ~ qt is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the stock constraint
(7), representing the marginal value of total wealth.6
The ￿rst-order conditions for a maximum are given by equations (10)-(13)
together with the transversality conditions:
uc(c;m)e
￿￿ = ~ ￿; (10)
4It is not hard to prove that the normality of the two goods is equivalent to the following
two conditions, respectively, umm ￿ ucmum
uc < 0; uccum
uc ￿ ucm < 0.
5Wang and Yip (1992) called the assumption pareto complementarity between con-
sumption and money.
6For notional simplicity, we will omit the time subscript in the following mathematical
presentations.
6um(c;m)e
￿￿ = (r + ￿)~ ￿; (11)
￿








￿￿~ ￿k = 0; lim
t!1
e
￿￿~ ￿￿ = 0: (14)
Equations (10) and (11) are two intratemporal optimality conditions, im-
plying that the marginal utility of consumption and (or) real balances equals
the real marginal valuation of wealth; equations (12) and (13) are two Euler
equations, which determine the intertemporal choices of consumption and
real money balances; and equation (12) is the Keynes-Ramsey condition,
which implicitly shows that the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption at two points of time must equal the marginal rate of transforma-
tion.
Now let us de￿ne the current-value Hamiltonian multipliers ￿ and ￿ as
a product of their corresponding present-value Hamiltonian multipliers and
e￿:
￿ = e
￿~ ￿;￿ = e
￿~ ￿: (15)
Taking the derivative of equation (15) with respect to t, we have:
￿
~ ￿ = [_ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿)￿]e
￿￿;
￿
~ ￿ = [_ ￿ ￿ ￿(￿)￿]e
￿￿: (16)
Substituting equation (10) into equation (15) leads to
uc(c;m) = ￿: (17)
Putting equations (16), (15) and (17) into equation (10) gives rise to
_ ￿ = ￿[r ￿ ￿(￿)]￿: (18)
Taking the derivative of equation (17) with respect to t; and using (17) and
(18) lead to







Equations (10) and (11) imply that:
um(c;m)
uc(c;m)
= (r + ￿): (20)
Hence, at optimum the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and real money balances is equal to the nominal interest rate, which is the
price of monetary services or the opportunity cost of holding money.
Finally, equations (13) and (16) together imply
_ ￿ = u(c;m) + ￿(￿)￿: (21)
2.2.2 Behavior of the Firm
It is assumed that the production function of the ￿rm is well bahaved, namely,
f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1; f(0 < k < 1) > 0, f0(0) = 1, f0(1) = 0; f0(0 < k <
1) > 0, f00(k) < 0; and that factor markets are competitive.7Accordingly,
r = f
0(k);w = f(k) ￿ kf
0(k): (22)
That is to say, the market interest rate equals the marginal productivity of
capital and the market wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labor.
2.2.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
In order to complete the system, we introduce the government￿ s bahavior.





and keeps its budget balanced:




7For simplicity, we assume that the rate of depreciation for capital is zero.
8where ￿ and g are two constants denoting the monetary growth rate and gov-
ernment expenditure, respectively. By the de￿nition of real money balances,
m = M
P . Substituting equation (23) into equation (24) results in
￿ + g = ￿m: (25)
We impose the assumption of perfect foresight which says that the ex-




Taking the derivative of m = M
P with respect to t, rearranging, and substi-
tuting equtions (23) and (26) into it, we have
_ m = (￿ ￿ ￿)m: (27)






From equation (28), we solve ￿ as a function of c;m;and k, i.e., ￿t =









< 0;￿k = ￿f
00(k) > 0:
(29)
Putting ￿t = ￿(c;k;m) into equation (27) gives the dynamics of real money
balances
_ m = (￿ ￿ ￿(c;k;m))m: (30)
Substituting equations (7), (22), (25), and (27) into equation (6) results in
the dynamic equation of physical capital accumulation
_ k = f(k) ￿ c ￿ g: (31)
Putting equations (22), (30), and ￿t = ￿(c;k;m) into equation (19) gives the
dynamic equation of consumption







(￿ ￿ ￿(c;k;m))m: (32)
Therefore, equations (30)-(32) describe the whole dynamics of the model.
2.3 Dynamics and the Steady State
2.3.1 The Steady State














Equation (33) gives the familiar modi￿ed golden-rule level of capital ac-
cumulation, which shows that, in the steady state, the marginal product of
physical capital equals the subjective time preference rate; equation (34) tells
that the steady-state production can be divided into two parts: one is the
steady-state level of consumption, and the other is the exogenous level of
government expenditure; and equation (35) shows that the steady-state level
of in￿ ation is equal to the exogenous level of monetary growth.
Furthermore, it is easy to see the existence and uniqueness of the steady
state from the steady-state equations (33)-(35) and the basic assumptions of
the model.
2.3.2 Stability of the Steady State
To examine the local stability of the steady state, we linearize equations

























































Let us de￿ne the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system as J. It is not
hard to ￿nd that
3 Y
i=1







Equation (37) implies that there exists one negative real eigenvalue or three
eigenvalues with negative real parts. The trace of the Jacobian matrix is
3 X
i=1















and we cannot decide its sign on the basis of the assumptions of the model.
In order to guarantee the saddle-point stability of the steady state, we impose
the following assumption:
tr(J) > 0: (39)
If condition (39) holds, then there exists a unique negative eigenvalue corre-
sponding to the unique predetermined variable k. Hence, the steady state is
a saddle point.
Notice that, the condition (39) is not stringent at all. In addition, the
curvature of the time preference function plays no role in the determination of
stability, since the second derivative of the time preference function does not
enter the Jacobian matrix J. For sure, let us see three numerical examples.
Example 1, Assume the utility function is separable in consumption and
real balances for simplicity: u(c;m) = logc+logm. Let the production be a
Cobb-Douglas technology: f(k) = k0:35. And de￿ne the time preference as a
concave function of the in￿ ation rate: ￿(￿) = log(￿ + 1:2): With ￿ = 0:001,
11the unique steady state is: k￿ = 2:7083, c￿ = 1:4172, m￿ = 7:6959, ￿￿ =
0:001, ￿￿ = 0:1832 and the corresponding eigenvalues are: ￿0:2921, 0:4103,
0:0957. Then tr(J) = 0:2139 > 0, and condition (39) is satis￿ed.
Example 2, Let the utility function, the production function and ￿ be the
same as in example 1. Let the time discount rate be: ￿(￿) = log(￿ + 0:01).
Then, the unique steady state is given by: k￿ = 205:0257, c￿ = 6:4437,
m￿ = 536:9720, ￿￿ = 0:001, ￿￿ = 0:011 and the corresponding eigenvalues
are: ￿0:0194, 0:0248, 0:0056. Now tr(J) = 0:0100 > 0; and condition (39)
holds again.
Example 3, Keep everything the same as in example 1 expect for the time
discount rate: ￿(￿) = exp(￿)￿0:998. Then, the unique steady state is given
by: k￿ = 1312:8879, c￿ = 12:9698, m￿ = 3242, ￿￿ = 0:001, ￿￿ = 0:0056 and
the three eigenvalues are: ￿0:0054, 0:0065, 0:00519. It is obvious the sum of
the three eigenvalues is positive tr(J) = 0:00629 > 0 as required by condition
(39).
Therefore, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 In the Sidrauski model with in￿ation aversion, if tr(J) > 0,
the steady state is locally saddle-point stable.
3 Macroeconomic Policy Analysis
3.1 Long-run E⁄ects of Monetary Policy
3.1.1 Monetary Non-superneutrality



















































Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A permanent increase in the monetary growth rate decreases
the steady-state consumption, capital accumulation and real balance holdings.
That is to say, money is not superneutral in the Sidrauski model with in￿ation
aversion.
In the standard Sidrauski model with a constant time preference rate,
the steady-state levels of capital stock and consumption are given by the
same conditions as those in the nonmonetary Ramsey model, and, they are
independent of the monetary growth rate. That is to say, money is superneu-
tral in the long run. However, in the Sidrauski model with in￿ ation aver-
sion, the time preference rate depends on the in￿ ation rate endogenously,
and hence, the steady-state level of capital depends on the in￿ ation rate
(or money growth rate). The logic for the failure of superneutrality is as
follows: an increase in the rate of money growth raises the rate of time pref-
erence in the steady state (￿0(￿) > 0), the steady-state interest rate increases
(dr￿
d￿ = ￿0(￿) > 0), and then the steady-state stock of capital falls because of
diminishing returns and higher rental costs. In turn, the fall in the capital
stock reduces net output and consumption. These conclusions are just what
Burns (1978) had said: in￿ ation ￿weakens the willingness to save. It drives
up the level of interest rates. It a⁄ects adversely both stock prices and bond
prices.￿
As in￿ ation rises, the opportunity cost of holding money is higher. Hence,
the steady-state level of real balances decreases. In the Sidauski model,
the money demand function is m￿ = m￿(￿;￿) and the e⁄ect of a positive
monetary disturbance is negative, i.e.,dm￿
d￿ = m￿
￿(￿;￿) < 0. But, in the model
with in￿ ation aversion, the money demand function is m￿ = m￿(￿(￿);￿) and
























13Hence, the total e⁄ect includes both the original Keynesian part, m￿
￿(￿;￿) and
the new part coming from￿in￿ ation aversion￿ , m￿









f00(k￿)]￿0(￿)). Therefore, the negative e⁄ect on real money balances of a
positive monetary disturbance is stronger.
The negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation is strong enough so that both consumption
and physical capital decrease, which is similiar to Stockman (1981) and Abel
(1985), but is di⁄erent from the positive e⁄ect of in￿ ation in Tobin (1965),
Uzawa (1968), Epstein & Hynes (1983), Obstfeld (1981), and Kam (2005).
And these conclusions a¢ rm the theoretical conjecture of Stockman (1981)
and the empirical evidences provided by Fischer (1993)8.
3.1.2 The Optimum Quantity of Money
To examine the optimality of Friedman￿ s rule for optimum quantity of money,






















d￿ ]￿(￿) ￿ ￿0(￿)u(c￿;m￿)
￿2(￿)
< 0: (45)
It is easy to ￿nd that the total e⁄ect of a permanent increase in monetary
growth on the equilibrium welfare can be divided into three negative parts:
a decrease in utility owing to a lower consumption, u￿
c
dc￿
d￿ ￿(￿); a decrease in
utility due to lower real balances, u￿
m
dm￿
d￿ ￿(￿); and a decrease in utility due
to increased impatience, ￿￿0(￿)u(c￿;m￿). Altogether, equation (45) tells us
that an increase in the monetary growth rate cuts the steady-state welfare.
Therefore, the equilibrium welfare can be improved by reducing the rate of
monetary growth. That is to say, Friedman￿ s rule for optimum quantity of
money is not optimal in the economy. In fact, we can expain this in another
way. Suppose that the Friedman rule still holds, that is, the nominal interest
rate is equal to zero. From equation (20), we have u￿
m = 0. Putting it






￿2(￿) ) < 0. This inequality
8Fischer (1993) demonstrates a 1% rise in in￿ ation can cost an economy on the order
of 0:1% in its rate of growth.
14implies that the steady-state level of welfare can be improved all along by
reducing the monetary growth rate. The optimum quantity of money may
be setting ￿ = ￿1, which is unreasonable and impossible. This implies that
the optimum quantity of money in Friedman￿ s sense does not hold in our
model.
3.2 Long-run E⁄ects of Fiscal Policy
3.2.1 Purely Crowding Out of Consumption
Similiar to section 3.1.1, setting d￿ = 0 in equation (40) and applying















Proposition 3 An increase in government expenditure reduces the steady-
state consumption and real balance holdings, whereas it has no e⁄ect on the
steady-state capital stock.
It is easy to see from equtions (46) and (47) that the long-run e⁄ects of
positive government disturbances are the same as the nonmonetary Ramsey
model: an increase of government expenditure crowds out private consump-
tion one-to-one, and it has no e⁄ect on the long-run capital accumulation.
And the negative e⁄ect on real money balances of an increase in government
expenditures can be expained intuitively. The budget constraint of the gov-
ernment says that the income of in￿ ation tax
_ M
P (= ￿m) can be divided into
two parts: the expenditure on the government consumption, g; and lump-sum
transfers to the private sector, ￿. If keeping ￿ and m constant and increasing
g; the monetary authorities must increase ￿ and, hence, the in￿ ation rate ￿.
Then, a private individual with in￿ ation aversion becomes more impatient,
and he increases current consumption and cuts real money balances.
153.2.2 The E⁄ect on the Steady-State Welfare



















The equation above implies that an increase of government expenditure
reduces the steady-state welfare. The negative e⁄ects can be divided into
two parts: one is from the decrease in consumption (
￿u￿
c
￿(￿)), and the other is




￿(￿) ). Then, with less patience and
higher opportunity costs of holding money, consumers increase consumption,
reduce savings and lower the holdings of money. In the long run, the steady-
state levels of consumption and real money balances are reduced, and so is
the welfare.
Furthermore, it may be interesting to exmine the long-run e⁄ects of a
￿scal expansion on the equilibrium in￿ ation rate. Totally di⁄ereciating ￿￿
t =


























First, we notice that the term ￿￿￿




dg is positive from equations (29) and (46). Hence, the total
e⁄ect is ambiguous.
4 Summary
In this short paper, by introducing the in￿ ation rate into the representative
agent￿ s time preference rate, we have reexamined the e⁄ects of monetary and
￿scal policies in the money-in-utility model. The comparative static analysis
has demonstrated: neither monetary superneutrality nor Friedman￿ s rule
for optimum quantity of money holds. Speci￿cally, with an increase of the
money growth rate, the steady-state consumption, physical capital stock,
real money balance holdings, and welfare all decrease. In addition, with a
rise in government expenditure, the steady-state consumption, real money
balances, and welfare will be reduced, whereas the steady-state capital stock
remains unchanged.
16References
[1] Abel, A., 1985. Dynamic Behavior of Capital Accumulation in a Cash-
in-advance Model. Journal of Monetary Economics 10, 55-71.
[2] Alvarez, F., Kehoe, P., Neumeyer, P., (2004). The Time Consistency of
Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies. Econometrica 72, 541-567.
[3] Bhattacharya, J., Haslag, J., Martin, A., 2005. Heterogeneity, Redis-
tribution, and the Friedman Rule. International Economic Review 46,
437-454.
[4] Bhattacharya, J., Haslag, J., Martin, A., 2009. Optimal Monetary Policy
and Economic Growth. Euopean Economic Review 53, 210-221.
[5] Bohm-Bawerk, E., 1891. The Positive Theory of Capital. (W. Smart,
Trans.), Macmillan, London.
[6] Burns, A., 1978. The Condition of the American Economy. American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Rerearch, Washington, D.C..
[7] Calvo, G., 1979. On Models of Money and Perfect Foresight. Interna-
tional Economic Review 20, 83-103.
[8] Chari, V., Christiano, L., Kehoe, P., 1996. Optimality of the Friedman
Rule in Economies with Distorting Taxes. Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 37, 203-223.
[9] Da Costa, C., Werning, I., 2008. On the Optimality of the Friedman Rule
with Heterogeneous Agents and Nonlinear Income Taxation. Journal of
Political Economy 116, 82-112.
[10] Ellison, M., Rankin, N., 2007. Optimal Monetary Policy when Lump-
sum Taxes are Unavailable: a Reconsideration of the Outcomes under
Commitment and Discretion. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 31, 219-243.
[11] Epstein, L., 1983. Stationary Cardinal Utility and Optimal Growth un-
der Uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory 31, 133-152.
[12] Epstein, L., 1987. The Global Stability of E¢ cient Intertemporal Allo-
cations. Econometrica 55, 329-355.
17[13] Epstein, L., Hynes, J., 1983. The Rate of Time Preference and Dynamic
Economic Analysis. Journal of Political Economy 91, 611-635.
[14] Fabricant, S., 1976. Economic Calculation under In￿ ation: the Problem
in Perspective. in Economic Calculation under In￿ ation. Liberty Press.
[15] Fisher, S., 1979. Capital Accumulation on the Transition Path in a Mon-
etary Optimizing Model. Econometrica 47, 1433-1439
[16] Fischer, S., 1993. The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth. Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 32, 485-512.
[17] Friedman, M., 1969. The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Es-
says. Chicago: Aldine.
[18] Gahvari, Firouz., 1988. Lump-sum Taxation and the Superneutrality
and Optimum Quantity of Money in Life Cycle Growth Models. Journal
of Public Economics 36, 339-367.
[19] Gahvari, F., 2007. The Friedman Rule: Old and New. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 54, 581-589.
[20] Gootzeit, M., Schneider, J., Smith, W., 2002. Marshallian Recursive
Preferences and Growth. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organiza-
tion 49, 381-404.
[21] Ireland, P., 1996. The Role of Countercyclical Monetary Policy. Journal
of Political Economy 104, 704-723.
[22] Kam, E., 2005. A Note on Time Preference and the Tobin E⁄ect. Eco-
nomics Letters 89, 127-132.
[23] Katona, G., (1975). Psychological Economics. New York: Elsevier.
[24] Keynes, M. J., (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest,
and Money. A Harvest/HBJ Book, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Pub-
lishers.
[25] Obstfeld, M., 1981. Macroeconomic Policy, Exchange-Rate Dynamics,
and Optimal Asset Accumulation. Journal of Political Economy 89,
1142-1161.
18[26] Obstfeld, M., 1990. Intertemporal Dependence, Impatience, and Dy-
namics. Journal of Monetary Economics 26, 45-75.
[27] Shiller, R., 1996. Why Do People Dislike In￿ ation? NBER working
paper.
[28] Sidrauski, M., 1967. Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Mon-
etary Economy. American Economic Review 57, 534-544.
[29] Stockman, A., 1981. Anticipated In￿ ation and the Capital Stock in a
Cash-in-advance Economy. Journal of Monetary Economics 8, 387-393.
[30] Tobin, J., 1965. Money and Economic Growth. Econometrica 33, 671-
684.
[31] Uzawa, H., 1968. Time Preference, the Consumption Function, and Op-
timal Asset Holdings. In: Wolfe, J.N.(Ed), Value, Capital and Growth;
Papers In Honor of Sir John Hicks. University of Edinburgh Press.
[32] Wang, P., Yip, C., 1992. Alternative Approaches to Money and Growth.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 24, 553-562.
19